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When imports are predominantly intermnediate  inputs  - as they
are in most developing countries  - import restrictions act as a
supply shock to the economy and therefore cannot always bK
relied on to improve the trade balance.
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The author's model demonstrates that when  One extension is to consider real wage
imports are predominantly internediate  inputs  rigidity and unemplo) nent. If capital in the
- as they are in most developing countries - short run is sector-specific, the net effect of a
import restrictions cannot always be relied upon  small tariff remains ambiguous - because an
to improve the trade balance.  Such restrictions  increase in the domestic price of imported inputs
act as a supply shock to the economy.  will cause a fall in employment and thus a
decrease in real income.
Unless nontraded goods are intensive users
of imported intermediates, the general-equilib-  Another extension is to consider domestic
rium consequence of import restrictions is a  production of the imported intermediate goods.
large enough reduction in export supplies to  Such production is likely to be an important
swamp the direct effect of the restrictions. The  factor in medium- and high-income countrics,
result is a deterioration in the trade balance.  but much less so in very poor countries. The
income effect of the tariff will still be negative,
One can check the robustness of the author's  though less so.
model results with extensions that may capture
more realistic features.
This paper is a product of the Trade Policy Division, Country Economics Depart-
ment.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Wash-
ington DC 20433.  Please contact Maria Ameal, room N8-069, extension 61466
(15 pages with tables).
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I.  Introduction
Intermediate  and  capital  goods  typically  constitute  the  bulk  of
developing  countries'  imports. Therefore,  when import  restrictions  are
imposed,  say  in response  to  balance-of-payments  difficulties,  these
restrictions  fall  predominantly  on  producer  goods,  confronting  the  domestic
economy  with a supply  shock  on  the input  side.  By reducing  domestic
output,  this  adverse  supply  effect  can  possibly  outweigh  the  direct
substitution  cffect  of the  restrictions,  and  thereby  lead  to a
deterioration  of the  trade  balance. How likely  is this  outcome,  and  can  we
deterrine  the  conditions  under  which  it  will  occur?
Table  1 shows  the  average  import  composition  of a large  sample  of
developing  countries  in  Africa,  Asia,  and  Latin  America  over  the  1975-85
period. The  average  share  of consumer  goods  in  total  imports  is  in all
cases  less  than  20  percent. Moreover,  a large  proportion  of the  imported
consumer  goods  is food,  with  non-food  consumer  goods  constituting  an almost
negligible  fraction  of total  imports. These  figures  clearly  suggest  the
need to increase  the  emphasis  on  models  that  explicitly  consider  imports  as
intermediate  inputs  (rather  than  final  goods)  in analyzing  trade  issues  in
developing  countries. Trade  policy  adjustments  are  not likely  to  have
significant  effects  on external  equilibrium  unless  they  directly  affect
imports  of intermediates  and/or  capital  goods.
The  trade  balance  can  be  analyzed  satisfactorily  only  in the
context  of a dynamic  model,  and  much  effort  has  gone  recently  into
constructing  such  models  (see,  for  example,  Svennson  and  Razin,  1983,  Razin
and  Svennson,  1983,  Obstfeld,  1982,  Engel  and  Kletzer,  1986,  Edwards,
1987). These  models  show  that  the  response  of the  current  account  to trade2
policies  or terms-of-trade  shocks  can  vary  considerably  depending  on the
modeling-strategy  pursued  and  on the  nature  of  the  intertemporal  linkages.
We use  here  the  simplest  dynamic  model (with  two  periods)  to  analyze  the
effects  of temporary  tariffs  on the  trade  balance. The  key difference  with
the  earlier  papers  is  that  we focus  on  tariffs  on intermediate  rather  than
consumer  goods. As  we also  abstract  from  the  investment  response,  this
framework  simplifies  the  intertemporal  linkages  considerably.  This  has the
desirable  consequence  that  the  effect  of a (small)  tariff  on the  trade
balance  can  be linked  in  a clear-cut  fashion  to the  productive  structure  of
the  economy.
Our  main result  is  that  the  direction  of change  of the  trade
balance  in the  short  run  depends  on the  Rybczynski  relationship  between  the
imported  intermediate  inputs  and  non-tradables.  When  a decrease  in  the
availability  of intermediates  leads  to a fall  in  non-tradables  production,
a small  enough  first-period  tariff  must improve  the  trade  balance  in the
short  run.  But  when  non-tradables  expand--as  they  might  when exportables
are intensive  in imported  intermediate  inputs--the  current  account  will
worsen. The  likelihood  of each  scenario  depends  on the  economy's
structU  e.  When import-competing  activities  that  are  intensive  in  imported
inputs  have  been  rendered  effectively  non-tradable  thanks  to  quotas,  the
odds  have  to  be  in favor  of  an  improvement  in  the  trade  balance. On  the
other  hand,  in an  economy  where  non-traded  goods  do not  significantly  rely
on imported  inputs,  the  perverse  response  is  quite  possible.
Moreover,  the  likelihood  of the  perverse  effect  increases  with the
size  of the  tariff  levels  affecting  inputs  of intermediate  goods. The
larger  is  the  tariff  level  the  greater  is  the  temporary  fall  in  real  income
associated  with a rise  in temporary  tariffs. Since  consumers  will spread3
out  their  reduced  consumption  over  time,  a temporary  fall  in real  income
induces  a  negative  effect  on the  current  account  in  the  short-run  by
increasing  the  consumptionlincome  ratio. Thus,  the  effect  of temporary
tariff  on imported  inputs  can  be separated  into  two  components,  namely,  an
output  composition  effect  and  a real  income  effect. While  the  former  is  in
general  ambiguous,  the  latter  always  points  toward  a  deterioration  of the
current  account  in the  short-run.
The  ensuing  analysis  concentrates  on the  case  of a  temporary
tariff,  which  is  the  one  for  which  the  effect  of a tariff  on the  current
account  in the  context  of a simple  final-goods  model  is  unambiguously
positive  (see  Razin  and  Svennson,  1983). In  our framework,  the  distinction
between  temporary  and  permanent  tariffs  does  not  play  as important  a role
because  in  both  cases  the  effect  of an import  tariff  on the  current  account
(in  the short-run)  is  ambiguous.
II.  The Hodel
We consider'a  small  open  economy  which  imports  only  intermediate
inputs  and  where  all  prices  are  flexible. The  economy  produces  two  types
of goods.  an exportable  and  a  non-tradable  (finished)  good. It is  assumed
that  import-substitute  finished  goods  are  non-trsoables.  This  presumption
can  be justified  on the  grounds  that  finished  importable  goods  are
typically  subject  to either  extremely  high import  tariffs  or  binding
quantitative  restrictions  on imports,  which  effectively  imply  that  the
domestic  price  of finished  import  substitutes  is  endogenous.  On the  other
hand,  we assume  that  intermediate  imports  are  not subject  to quantitative
restrictions  and  that  their  domestic  prices  are  determined  by the  border4
prices,  plus  import  tariffs.  (The  analysis  remains  unchanged  when  trade
restrictions  take  the  form  of  quantitative  restrictions  on  intermediates
rather  than  tariffs.)  These  assumptions  are  consistent  with  stylized  factt
for  many  LDCs,  particularly  in  Latin  America  and  Africa  where  finished-good
imports  are  largely  restricted  while  intermediate-good  imports  are  subject
to  fewer  restrictions  and  relatively  low  tariffs.
We  consider  a  two-period  model  of  the  economy  where  a  budget
constraint  assures  that  the  present  value  of  expenditures  in  the  two
periods  equals  the  present  value  of  income  plus  initial  (net)  assetss
1  1  262.  1 1  1 (1)  E(pl,  Px  6Pn'  xp2;  W) '  f(Pn  Px  1 + t 1 )
+  6  12(p2 PX2,  1)  - t  f3(*)  +  A0
where  E(A)  stands  for  the  economy's  expenditure  function,  which  is concave
and  linearly  homogenous  in  all  prices;  Pi  and  Pn  are  the prices  of  non-
n  Pn~~1 
tradable  (finished)  goods  in  period  1  and  2,  respectively;  p1 and px are
the  corresponding  export  prices;  W is  a  measure  of  welfare;  t 1 is  an  ad-
valorem  tariff  (or,  equivalently,  the  quota  premium)  in  period  1  on  imports
of  intermediate  goods;  6  is  the  discount  factor;  pl(e)  and  r2(@) are  GDP
functions  in  periods  1  and  2,  respectively;  1/ Ao  is  the initial  level  of
wealth;  and -f  ,  - . ml  is  the  quantity  of  intermediate  imports  in
period  1 (using  Hotelling's  lemma). It  is  assumed  in  (1)  that  the  tariff
revenue  is  returned  to  the  private  sector  in  lump-sum  fashion.  Moreover,
the  world  price  of  intermediate  goods  is  assumed  to  be  equal  to  unity.
Therefore  1+tl  is  the  price  of  intermediate  imports  in  period  1. The
domestic  price  of  exports  is  assumed  exogenous  and  equal  to  the  world5
price. We also  assume  that  the  economy  can  borrow  and  lend  freely  in
internat-ional  capital  markets,  which  equates  a  to  the  world  discount  factor
(one  over one  plus the world  interest  rate). Hence,  the  only  endogenous
1  2 variables  in (1)  are  Pn'  Pn  and  W.  Implicit  in  the  GDP functions  are  the
levels  of  primary  factors  of production,  as  well  as the  intermediates.
These  functions  yield  the  maximized  value  of  national  output  given  that
productive  factors  are  competitively  allocated  between  exportables  and  non-
traded  goods.
The  GDP functions  fl(e)  and  v2(s)  are  linearly  homogenous  and
convex  functions  of the  three  prices,  and  their  derivatives  with respect  to
pl and  pn  provide  the  output supply equations  for non-tradables in  the
first  and  second  period,  respectively  (Hotelling's  lemma). Similarly, the
derivatives  of the  expenditure  function  with respect  to  pn and  p2  yield  the
(compensated)  demand  functions  for  non-tradables  in  period  1 and  2,
respectively.
Thus,  equilibrium  in the  non-tradable  market  in  each  period
requires:
1  1  2  2  1 1  1
(2)  El(pnl  p.  5 n'  6p 1. W) - 'ir(n px  1  +t 1)
and
(3)  E3(pn,  Px,  5Pn  5Px;  W) - u2(pn P,  1)
where  E1 _  l , 1= al  etc. The  equation  system (1)  to (3)  can  be used
n  n  1  2
to  solve  simultaneously  for  the  three  endogenous  variables,  p  n'  Pn and W.6
The  trade  balance  in  period  2 is given  bys
(4)  B2  p2 (12  2 x'  2  E  ) +3*
where  the  arguments  of each  function  are  omitted. The  first  term  in paren-
theses  represents  exports  of the  exportable,  while  the  last  term  is  the
imports  of the  intermediate  (with  a  negative  sign). Since  intertemporal
balance  requires  B1 +  6B2 + AO - 0,  2/ it is  clear  that  an improvement  in
the  trade  balance  in  period  2  necessarily  implies  a  deterioration  in  the
trade  balance  in  period  1  and  vice  versa.  As the  expression  for  B2 does  not
1  2 contain  tl,  the  effects  of  a temporary  tariff  must  work through  Pn.  Pn.  and
W.  Since  it  proves  easier  to  work  with  B2, we will derive  the  effect  on
the short-run  balance  B1 by performing  comparative  statics  on B2.
Differentiating  (1)  totally,  and  using  conditiuns  (2)  and (3)  we
can  solve  for  the  effect  on  welfare:
t  11l
(5)  dW - - 1  3  3  dt3
which  is  negative  for  any  strictly  positive  level  of the  tariff. Differ-
entiating  (2)  and (3)  using  (5)  we obtain:
E  1
M  (E  p1  +6E1d2  1  1w_.I33  d
11  n  13 Pn  (1"13  +  E  ]d 1 (i)  E11 - f11  dPn  +  s1dpn  .- r  1EX
(6)
(ii) 31  dpn  + (6E3  1)  dp2  t*  E  I  1  d (ii)  E  dp1+  OE  -f2) )dp2 - 3w  33  dt
31  33  11  n  EW  It.  I
7  pl
If initially  the  tariff  is  zero (i.e.,  t1 - 0) then  there  is  no *income"
effect  (OW-0)  and  we obtain,
dp  1  (E  -2 
dn -13  33  11
(i)  dt  '  I  HI
d1H
(7)
dp2  1  E
(ii)  dn  - 13  E13
dt1 I  H I
I  1  (El11  s13
where  H _  2
E13 (6E33 - r11)
which  is  positive  given  concavity  of the  E(w) function  and  convexity  of the
GDP  functions  irl()  and *2(X). Under  the  reasonable  assumption  that  non-
traded  goods  are  intertemporal  substitutes  (E 13 >  0),  it is  clear  from (7)
that  the  prices  of the  non-traded  goods  must  move in  the  same direction  in
the  two  periods. (Note  that  - E  12  <  o  under  regular  curvature  assump- 33 11
tions). This  is required  for  the  second-period  market  for  non-traded  goods
to  clear: when pn falls  (rises),  the  incipient  excess supply  (demand)  for
the  non-tradable  in the  second  period  --  caused  by inter-temporal  substitu-
2
tion  --  has  to  be eliminated  by a similar  movement  in  Pn.
Whether  the  prices  of  non-tradables  increase  or decrease  depends
I1  in turn  on the  sign  of r  3  NJD /at 1 ,  where  1 is  the  output  of  nontrada-
bles in  period  1.  In general  ambiguous,  this  sign  depends  on the  nature  of
the  general-equilibrium  Rybczynski  relationship  between  imported  inter-
mediates  and  non-tradables.  As t, increases,  the  demand  for  intermediates8
naturally  falls. Whether  this  reduces  or spurs  the  production  of non-
tradables  depends  on  how  intensive"  non-tradables  are in  intermediates.
It is  usually  presumed  that  exports  in  most  LDCs,  mostly  agricultural  and
other  natural-resource  based  commodities,  are  less  intensive  users  ot
imported  inputs  than  import-substituting  and  other nontradables,  usually
manufactured goods. When  this  is  the  case,  an increase in  the  price of
intermediates  will reduce  the  supply  of  nontradables,  i.e. rl3  <  0.  But
when it  is exportables  that  are  relatively  more  intensive  in  imported  in-
termediates  it is  possible that  the  resources  released  by the  exportables
sector as it  contracts could  lead  to an  expansion  of the  non-tradables
sector (crl >  0).  In the  tirst case,  the 'real' exchange  rate  faced  by 13
consumers (Px/Pn) would  appreciate  in  both  periods  as  dpn/dtl  >  0  and
dp2/dt  > 0; in the  second,  it  would  depreciate.
The  ultimate  effect  on  the  current  account  can  be derived  by
totally  differentiating  B2  with respect  to tl:
2  d2  d1
dB-  222  2~  n  2  dn
(8)  dt  - (r2lPx  +  l  3  pxE34)  dt  - PxE 41 dt
1  1  1
(Remember  that  dW  - 0 at t1 =  0.)  Noting  that  under  the  assumption  of  non-
complementarity  in  consumption  E14 >  0, E34 >  0  and,  by linear  homogeneity
of  *2,  that  2  2  +  f2  2  - l Pn  <  0,  it is  clear  that  the  sign
2  dp 1 xlp
B  - - sign  d  - - sign  d  . Also  since dBl  - -6dB 2 we obtain  that  a
(small)  temporary  tariff  on imports  in  period  1  will  cause  an  improvement
in the  trade  balance  in  the  short-run  only if pn and  pn  increase,  i.e.,
only  when the  consumer  real  exchange  rate  appreciates  in  both periods. As9
discussed above,  this is  the  case  when  non-tradables  are  intensive  in
imported-intermediate  inputs  (ci3  < 0).
These  results  can  be summarized  and  interpreted  as follows. The
effect  that  a (small)  temporary  tarlff  placed  on intermedlate  Lmports  has
on the  current  account  depends  entlrely  on the  productlon  response. ThLs
ln turn  s  determlned  by the  economy's  structure.  When  non-tradables  are
intensive  ln imported  intermediates,  the  tarlff  acts  as a  supply shock  ln
thls  sector  (  I  <  0).  The  current  account  improves  both  on the  accoint 'i13
of  the  direct substLtutLon  effect  of the  tariff and  on  account  of
resources  released  from  non-tradables  whLch  can  now  go to  exportable.
When  the  lnput tariff  leads  to an expansLon  of the  non-tradables
13 sector  (f13  0),  the  explanation  is  a  bit  more subtle.  Nov  the  indirect
effect  of the  tarlff  is  negatlve  --  as the  necessary  contractlon  of the
exportables  sector  reduces  export  supply. The  net effect  on the  current
account  could  be thought  amblguous. It ls ln fact  not so,  due  to liter-
temporal  linkages. Remember  that  the  prlces  of  non-tradables  must  move in
the  same  dlrectlon  ln the  two  periods: otherwlse  the  second-perlod  market
for  non-tradables  would  not  clear. Now,  when  I  0, we have  dpn  Idt <  0,
so that  d2  <  0.  Thls  lncreases  the  relative  prlce  of  exportables ln the
second  period,  and  spurs  thelr  productlon.  Consumption  of  exportables,  on
the  other  band  falls,  as  consumers  substLtute  towards  chapear  non-tradables
(in  both  periods). And since  there  is  no tarlff  in  the  second  period,  the
effect  on  the second-perLod  current  accrk,t  is  unambLguously  posLtlve.  By
impllcatLon,  the fLrst-period  current  account  must  deteriorate. In  other
words,  in  the  short-run  the  lndLrect  negatlve  effect  of the  tariff  on the
current  account  must  outweLgh  its  dlrect  posltlve  effect.10
So far,  the  discussion  has focussed  on a small  tariff  starting
from  a zero  base.  If the  initial  tariff  is  non-zero,  then  a tariff
increase  has a first-order  welfare  effect  and (7)  becomes:
d1  i1  (  r  +(  1/  (E CE  r2  - E  E]
(i)  dpn  13(E 33- 11  1  33  w  v  33  11  13 3w
(7')
dp2  - X  E  +  (t113/E  )  1(E  - E  3Elw]
Cii)  ~n  13  33~ t1  33I)  (CEl- 11  1
where  given the  assumptions  about substitution  and  normality  (E 13 >  0,
1 Elw  >  0) the  expressions  in square  brackets  are  negative  and  tjW 33/Ew  >  0.
The  expression for  the  change in  the  second period  trade  balance  (8)  in
turn  has  the  additional  term -Ps  E4wdW  on the  right-hand  side,  which  tends
to improve the  second-period  balance  as  W  falls. Thus,  even  if the  non-
traded  sector  is intensive  in imported  inputs  (i.e.,  even  if 113  <  0) it  is
now  possible  that  Pn and  Pn will fall,  and  that the  effect on  B1  will be
negative,  generating  a perverse  trade  balance  effect  in the  short  run.
The  explanation  is as follows. The  current  account  in  any  period
is the  difference  between  income  and  expenditure.  When  the  initial  tariff
is  positive,  trade  restrictions  cause  first-period  real  income  to fall.
Private  consumption  does  not  fall  one-for-one  in the  short-run,  however,  as
consumers  prefer  to spread  the  implied  reduction  in  consumption  over  both
periods. In  other  words,  they  dissave  in the  first  period. This  makes  it
more likely  for  the  trade  balance  to deteriorate  in the  first  period  (and
improve  in the  second  period)  in response  to  a temporary tariff increase.11
If rl >  0,  then  of  course,  the  perverse short-run effect  on the  trade 13
balance  will  be unambiguous.  3/
III. Concluding  Remarks
Our  model  demonstrates  that  when  imports  are  predominantly
intermediate  inputs,  as in  most  developing  countries,  import  restrictions
cannot  be always  relied  on to  generate  an improvement  in the  trade  balance.
Such  restrictions  act  as a supply  shock  to  the  economy. Unless  non-traded
goods  are  particularly  intensive  in  imported  intermediates,  the  general-
equilibrium  consequence  of import  restrictions  is  a large  enough  reduction
in  export  supply  to swamp  the  direct  effect  of the  restrictions,  thus
leading  to  a deterioration  of the  trade  balance.
The  model  used is,  of course,  very stylized. It is  important  to
check  the  robustness  of the  results  with extensions  that  may capture  more
'realistico  features. One  possible  extension  is  to consider  real  wage
rigidity  and  unemployment.  If capital  is in the  short-run  sector  specific,
under  the  plausible  assumption  of gross  complementarity  between  labor  and
imported  inputs  V13  is in this  case  necessarily  negative,  thus  pointing
toward  an improvement  in the  trade  account  due  to  the  output  composition
effect. However,  now  even  a small  import  tariff  will  necessarily  have  a
negative  income  effect,  which  points  toward  a perverse  effect  on the  trade
account. This  is due  to  the  fact  that  under  gross  complementarity  an
increase  in  the  domestic  price  of imported  inputs  causes  a fall  in
empioyme:..  and,  hence,  a decrease  in real  income. Therefore,  the  ne'.
effect  of a small  tariff  remains  ambiguous.12
Another  extension  would  consider  the  possibility  of domestic
production  of the  imported  intermediate  goods. This  is likely  to be
important  in  the  context  of  medium-income  and  large  countries  but  much less
so for  very  poor  countries. In this  case  the  likelihood  of the  perverse
effect  is  of  course  diminished  because  the  negative  income  effect  of the
tariff  would  be  weaker. Nonetheless,  the  output  composition  effect  would
still  critically  depend  on the  sign  Of 1l3  and  it is  still  possible  that
the  net  effect  of a  tariff  on the  trade  balance  will  be perverse.13
T&ble  1.  TmDort  Comosition In  Develoning  Countries
-.  For the  Period  1975-85
I  port  Share  o  UglanAfrica 2 Asia 3 Latin  America4
- Consumer  Goods  0.175  0.138  0.152
(food)  (0.124)  (0.107)  (0.098)
- Intermediates  & Capital  0.825  0.862  0.848
(Intermediate  Inputs)  (0.487)  (0.577)  (0.528)
Sourcet The  World  Bank (CECTP)
1/  Simple  country  average  shares  in total  country  imports.
2/  The  sample  includes  13  African  countries: Ivory  Coast,  Ghana,
NigerLa,  Zaire,  Zambia,  Malawi,  Senegal,  Morocco,  Tunlsia,  iimbabwe,
Tanzania,  Kenya,  and  Tunisia.
31  The  11  Asian  countries  are: Pakistan,  India,  Turkey,  Indonesia.
Singapore,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Korea,  Thailand,  Bangladesh,  and
Sri  Lanka.
Q/  The  14  Latin  American  countries  ares Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia,
Chile,  Mexico,  Peru,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Costa  Rlca,  Guatemala,
Panama,  Guyane,  Ecuador  and  Jamaica.14
Footnotes
1/  The ri(0)  (i-1,2)  are defined as follows:
ri  _ max [Ri(pn,  Px, mi) - (1  + ti)  mi]
mi
where  Ri(e)  is  the  revenue  function  in  period  i,  which  reflects  the
optimal  output  allocation  of a given  level  of imported  intermediate
inputs  and  primary  factors  (omitted  in  R(-)). Thus,  ri is the maximum
GDP level  given pl  Pi  and  1 + ti,  and  given  that  primary  factors
(assumed  fixed)  have  been  competitively  allocated  to the  production  of
the  two  final  goods.
2/  This  can  be derived,  by Walras'  law,  by  using  equations  (1)  - (3).
Note  also  that  in  the  initial  equilibrium  the  first-period  current
account  need  not  be in  balance.
1  2 31  Incidentally,  when there  exists  an initial  distortion,  Pn  and  Pn  need
no longer  move in the  same  direction  if  f1l<  O, although  both  will fall 13
when  irl > 0. 1315
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